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POVERTY LAW AND THE CHARTER:
THE YEAR IN REVIEW
Ian Morrison*
INTRODUCTION
The implications of an entrenched Charter of Rights for the economi-
cally disadvantaged has been and no doubt will continue to be a hotly
contested issue amongst poverty law advocates, activists and academ-
ics.1 This article will take the opportunity to deal with one aspect of
this larger debate-the impact of the Charter on some key poverty law
areas-in the context of a review of litigation developments over the
past year.
In particular, the article will focus on social welfare programs provid-
ing direct benefits in cash or kind. These programs have the greatest
direct impact on the situation of the low income community and form
the core of the Canadian social welfare system. The article does not
attempt to cover all the contexts in which the Charter has been
invoked on behalf of disadvantaged groups in Canadian society,
including some areas of law, such as immigration, which are unques-
tionably important for particular sectors of the low income commu-
nity. Nor does it purport to be a comprehensive review of specific
issues that intersect but go beyond the low income community, such
* Copyright 1 1990 Ian Morrison. Ian Morrison is a research lawyer and Executive
Director of the Clinic Resource Office of the Ontario Legal Aid Plan. He is cur-
rently working on an LLM at Osgoode Hall Law School in Toronto in which
some of the issues raised in this article are considered in greater depth.
1. See Reuben Hasson, "What's Your Favourite Right? The Charter and
Income Maintenance Legislation" (1989), 5 J.L. & Social Policy 1; Michael
Mandel, The Charter of Rights and the Legalization of Politics in Canada
(Toronto: Wall and Thompson, 1989); cf. Kathleen Ruff, "The Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms: A Tool For Social Justice?" (1989-9) 13(2)
Perception 19; and see the Mission Statement of the Charter Committee on
Poverty Issues, a national organization of poverty law advocates and low
income activists, dedicated to using the Charter in courts and tribunals "to
achieve law reform, to enhance economic and social equity, to educate the
public, to sensitize the Bench to poverty issues, and to create a climate that
encourages progressive change. The Charter Committee on Poverty Issues is
dedicated to using this locus in a strategic and thoughtful way to contribute
to the ultimate elimination of poverty".
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as more general issues of gender discrimination or disability discrimi-
nation litigation. The condition of economic deprivation is, of course,
closely related to other modalities of disadvantage and oppression.
However, a consideration of this complex and sometimes contradictory
relationship is beyond the scope of an article such as this.
CHARTER LITIGATION AND SOCIAL BENEFIT
PROGRAMS: THE YEAR IN REVIEW
This section will review both judicial decisions and selected tribunal
decisions and litigation initiatives in relation to a number of social
welfare benefit programs. Most of the programs reviewed are part of
the collection of federal and provincial social assistance and social
insurance programs which provide direct cash transfers to individuals
and families. While not all people living in poverty rely primarily on
such programs for subsistence, the individual/state relationship is most
directly and closely articulated for the economically disadvantaged
through the legal regimes established by these programs and they are
obviously areas of major importance for poverty law practice. The sec-
tion will also consider some decisions in relation to government
funded health care programs which help to illustrate the general
themes I propose to examine here. (I have only reviewed areas in
which I am aware of some judicial activity in the past year- thus, some
specific income maintenance programs and some in-kind social bene-
fit programs such as subsidized housing, are not discussed.)
1. SOCIAL ASSISTANCE
As the social security program of last resort and thus an important
focus for poverty law advocacy, social assistance has been the site of
some of the greatest expectations around the Charter and social wel-
fare. However, although there have been some very important recent
non-Charter decisions affecting social assistance2 , there is still very lit-
tle Charter caselaw in this area. There appear to have been only two
2. These would of course include the decision of the Federal Court of Appeal in
Finlay v. Canada (July 6, 1990) A-76-89 (F.C.A.) [unreported], holding that
deductions from welfare allowances to recover alleged overpayments violated
the terms of a cost-sharing agreement between the province of Manitoba and
the federal government under the Canada Assistance Plan; and the decision of
the British Columbia Court of Appeal in Reference re the Canada Assistance Plan
(1990) 71 DLR (4th) 99, holding that the federal government could not unilater-
ally "cap" transfer payments under the Canada Assistance Plan without consul-
tation with the provinces affected.
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judicial decisions in the past year in which the Charter was directly
considered in relation to a provincial social assistance plan.
The first is Mclnnis v. Director of Social Planning Department3, in which
it was held that the denial of welfare assistance to a pregnant 16-year-
old living with her family did not violate s.15. The welfare policy in
question allowed benefits to pregnant unmarried women pending
birth, but a municipality had a further policy of only allowing such
benefits to a woman living at home where she was over 19, this being
the age at which the parental obligation of support under provincial
law ceased. The Charter issue was dealt with very briefly. The Court
held that the policy did not violate s.15(l) because the reason for deny-
ing social assistance was not age but the fact that woman over 19 were
not required to be supported by their families. Rogers J. held, "Age, in
this case, is not discriminatory, but the criterion by which a person is
determined to be an adult."4 He went on to add that if the distinction
was discriminatory, it was "justified in the name of the rights and obli-
gations to be attached to adulthood and childhood and supported
under s.1 of the Charter.5 The case was reversed on appeal on statu-
tory interpretation grounds without reference to the Charter.6 The sec-
ond decision is Tanguay v. Quebec7, in which it was held that requiring
a welfare recipient to repay benefits upon reciept of a damage award
for personal injuries did not violate s.7, on the grounds that the award
was an economic right not protected by s.7.
In this area, as in most of the areas discussed below, the number of
cases that have proceeded to decision is not representative of the
amount of litigation activity.8 The following are some examples of this
3. (1989), 92 N.S.R.(2d) 254, 237 A.P.R. 254 (S.C.T.D.).
4. Ibid. at 297.
5. bid.
6. Re Mclnnis and Crowell (1990), 70 D.L.R.(4th) 296 (N.S.C A.).
7. (1990), 21 A.C.W.S.(3d) 401 (Que.S.C.) [unreported].
8. Here and below I will be referring to litigation initiatives which have either
been discontinued or have not yet resulted in decision. This by no means
purports to be an exhaustive review of these initiatives: the examples given
here are ones which I have learned about in my professional capacity and
most involve clients represented by Ontario community legal clinics. Identi-
fying information will not be given about clients in matters, whether con-
cluded or not, which have not proceeded to courts of public record.
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activity illustrating both the range of issues that have been raised and
the extent to which some of these cases involve fundamental questions
of social welfare policy.
Several challenges have been brought to age-based distinctions in
social assistance programs. A case in Ontario challenging a rule deny-
ing welfare to persons in need between the ages of 18 and 21 living at
home, while allowing it for people the same age living away from their
parents, was discontinued this year when the issue became moot, but
is almost certain to arise again.9 Another Ontario case has challenged
a welfare rule which prohibits single persons under 16 from receiving
welfare in their own right regardless of their circumstances. However,
although the case was argued before the Ontario Social Assistance
Review Board more than a year ago, the Board has still not decided
the preliminary issue of its jurisdiction to consider the Charter issue
and has not yet heard argument on the substantive issue.10 Similar
restrictions exist in most social assistance legislation, as do various
other rules restricting the eligibility of teenagers and young adults;
many of these also are likely to be challenged in the near future.11
A very important challenge has been brought in British Columbia to
rules governing the obligation of sole-support mothers in receipt of
social assistance to seek child support from the father(s) of their
child(ren). The legislation in question, depending on the circum-
stances, allows the Crown to bring support proceedings against the
mother's will; it also allows the Crown to enter into or modify a sup-
port agreement on her behalf and prevent her from initiating and
9. The applicant in the case in question turned 21 before the Charter issue was
raised in the proceedings; since she had been receiving interim assistance pend-
ing the outcome of the appeal, there was no longer a live issue to be tried. The
client was represented by Kinna-aweya Legal Clinic, Thunder Bay.
10. The claimant is represented by Justice for Youth and Children, Toronto.
Counsel for the youth has indicated to me that even if this particular case
does not go ahead, they intend to pursue the issue.
11. For example, it has been reported that the Court Challenges Program has
approved funding for case development for a case to challenge an Alberta
social assistance rule which imposes serious restrictions on the eligibility of 16
and 17 years olds: see 10 Canadian Human Rights Advocate (May 1990) 7.
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maintaining control over an action for support. 12 The case raises
important issues under both ss.7 and 15 of the Charter around the
rights of single mothers on welfare to privacy and autonomy but will
probably not be heard for at least a year, if at all.13
A final example in this area: in Nova Scotia, a challenge has been
brought to rules allowing for a pre-hearing termination of welfare ben-
efits. 14 This challenge attempts to raise directly the question of
whether s.7 affords any direct protection of welfare rights, a question
which does not yet seem to have been directly addressed in a Cana-
dian case, although it has been the subject of much academic specula-
tion.15 (It is particularly interesting that this case involves essentially
the same issue addressed by the U.S. Supreme Court in its landmark
decision of Goldberg v. Kelly16, the first decision to recognize welfare as
a constitutionally protected interest under the Due Process clause of
the U.S. Constitution.) The case is expected to go to trial sometime in
the next few months.
2. WORKERS' COMPENSATION
The most important social insurance programs at the provincial level
are the various provincial workers' compensation schemes. The impact
of the Charter on any of these schemes has been minimal to date. It
has been long settled, at least in lower courts, that compensation bene-
12. Federated Anti-Poverty Groups of British Columbia et aL v. Attorney General of Brit-
ish Columbia et al. (Statement of claim # A893060, Vancouver Registry, B.C.S.C.,
filed Nov. 15, 1989). The plaintiffs are represented by the Legal Services Society
of B.C. and the B.C. Public Interest Centre.
13. According to Gwen Brodsky from the Public Interest Advocacy Centre in
Vancouver, counsel for the corporate plaintiffs, the Crown has made a pre-
liminary challenge to the standing of all the plaintiffs. That issue has been
argued but is still under reserve in the B.C. Supreme Court.
14. The claimant is represented by the Metro Community Law Clinic, Halifax
N.S.
15. See Ian Johnstone, "Section Seven of the Charter and Constitutionally Pro-
tected Welfare" (1977), 45 U.T. Fac. L. Rev. 1; Ian Morrison, "Security of the
Person and the Person in Need: Section Seven of the Charter and the Right
to Welfare" (1988), 4 J. L. & Social Pol'y 1; Martha Jackman, "The Protec-
tion of Welfare Rights under the Charter" (1988), 20 Ottawa Law Review
257.
16. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
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fits are not protected by s.7.17 So far, it does not appear that injured
workers will have much more success in using s.15 to challenge these
programs. The terse decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in the
Reference Re ss.32,34 of the Workers' Compensation Act (Nfd.)18 seems to
have ended any likelihood of injured workers per se being considered
a "disadvantaged group" within the meaning of the Andrews equality
test.19 Neither of the two decisions of which I am aware from the past
year resulted in rulings favourable to the claimant
In Auger v. Alberta (WC.B.)20, it was held that provincial workers' com-
pensation legislation which exempted from compulsory coverage "any
industry carried on by an Indian or Band on a reserve" did not dis-
criminate on grounds of race. The reason given for the exemption was
that the Board could not enforce assessment levies against employers
on a reserve because of provisions in the Indian Act exempting them
from execution. Holmes J. held that "the actual distinction drawn by
the impugned legislation is between those employers granted the pro-
tection of ss.89 and 90 of the Indian Act and those employers not
granted such protection."21 He went on to suggest that, even though it
was clear that most of the workers excluded from coverage by the rule
were in fact Indians22, the distinction was not discriminatory because
it applied to all employees on a reserve regardless of race: "This being
so, it can be said an employee has a choice of whether to be covered
17. E.g see Re Terzian and WC.B. et al (1983), 42 O.R.(2d) 144 (Div.Ct.); Ryan v.
W.CB. (1984), 6 OA.C. 33 (Div.Ct.); Re Katnich and W.CB. (1988), 48 D.L.R.(4th)
699 (B.C.S.C.).
18. (1989), 56 D.L.R.(4th) 765 (S.C.C.), affirming (1987), 44 D.L.R.(4th) 501
(Nfld.CA.).
19. The leading decision from the Supreme Court of Canada on the interpreta-
tion of s.15(1) of the Charter remains Andrews v. Law Society of B.C. (1989),
56 D.L.R.(4th) 1, 119891 2 W.W.R. 289. The test for a violation of s.15(l)
enunciated in that case is commonly referred to as the "Andrews test". The
requirements of this test in the context of social welfare equality litigation
will be considered in more detail below.
20. (1989), 61 D.L.R.(4th) 660 (Alta.Q.B.)
21. Ibid., at 669.
22. The Court appears to have accepted that "most, but not all, employees work-
ing in industries on the...Reserve are status Indians": Ibid., 663.
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or not when he [sic] takes employment".23 Finally, he held that any
discrimination was justified in any event under s.l: since compensa-
tion was provided entirely from levies and the Board could not enforce
levies against industries on reserves, the exclusion was justified by "the
desire to assure and maintain the integrity of the Accident Fund".24
In Re Heidekamp and Director of Support and Custody Enforcement25, an
Ontario decision, it was held that a provision of the Ontario Workers'
Compensation Act which permitted 100% of a compensation pension to
be diverted to pay a support or maintenance order did not violate
s.15.26 The Court agreed that the applicant suffered a disadvantage in
relation to wage earners and recipients of other kinds of income main-
tenance payments and that the distinction was "related to" the
applicant's disability. It held, however, that the statute was not dis-
criminatory because the burden on the applicant was "not...the result
of the distinction identified (his physical disability), but is the result of
his choice, while employed, to default in his child support obligations
and to bring no application for review".27
3. CANADA PENSION PLAN
Of the major income maintenance programs in Canada, the Canada
Pension Plan seems to have been subject of the least judicial activity
to date. The highest level of appellate jurisdiction in CPP matters rests
with the Pension Appeals Board-a unique administrative tribunal in
income maintenance matters in that its members are superior court
judges-which sits in appeal from decisions of Review Committees,
appointed ad hoc to hear individual appeals.
The PAB has yet to seriously engage with a substantive Charter argu-
ment. The Board initially took the position that it had no jurisdiction
23. ]bid, at 670.
24. Ibid., at 671.
25. (1989), 69 O.R.(2d) 607 (Ont.Unif.Fam.Ct.)
26. However, Hamilton Mountain Community and Legal Services, who repre-
sented the claimant, successfully lobbied the Ministry of Labour and the
Attorney General to amend the legislation to make the Workers' Compensa-
tion Act consistent with the Wages Act.
27. Supra, note 25 at 612.
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to decide Charter issues.28 It reconsidered and reversed this opinion in
Minister of National Health and Welfare v. Kilpatrick29, but held that it
was not necessary to decide the substantive issue raised in that case,
which involved the rights of a former wife to a division of unadjusted
pensionable earnings following divorce. The Court held that the rele-
vant date for the purposes of the application of the Charter was the
divorce, which had occurred prior to the date s.15(1) came into effect
It seems that the only post-Kilpatrick case in which the Board has con-
sidered a Charter argument is Muller v. Minister of National Health and
Welfare3 °. The appellant in Muller had insufficient contributory earn-
ings for a CPP disability pension but had contributed to a compulsory
national pension plan while resident in Switzerland during his con-
tributory period. The Board summarily rejected his argument that his
s.15 rights were violated by the failure of the Canadian government to
enter into a reciprocal transfer arrangement for pension credits with
Switzerland, stating that "Neither this Board nor any Court of compe-
tent jurisdiction can use s.15 to usurp the political function of the
Government of Canada to make arrangements with foreign States or
to refrain from doing so, or to forge links with them by agreement or
otherwise."
Again, this jurisprudence does not reflect the full extent of litigation
activity around CPP issues and it is clear that the PAB will soon be
faced with other substantive Charter issues. One such issue is the con-
stitutionality of the limitation period for applying for a CPP disability
pension. The plan requires an applicant to have made contributions
for a certain period before being eligible for a disability pension and
also requires that an application for benefits be made within a fixed
period of time from the end of the contribution period. Potential
28. Minister of National Health and Welfare v. Kruzel (1988), C.E.B.&P.G.Rep. #8533
at 5999.
29. (Aug. 11, 1989, PA.B.) [unreported]. The Board held that it (and by infer-
ence a Review Committee) had jurisdiction under s.52(l) of the Constitution
Act but not under s.24(l) of the Charter. The issue of the jurisdiction of
administrative tribunals to consider and apply the Charter is discussed fur-
ther below. The Board's decision in this case seems to be consistent with the
weight of judicial authority in this area.
30. (Sep. 8, 1989), C.E.B.&P.G.Rep. #8593.
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applicants, especially those with psychiatric disorders such as para-
noid schizophrenia and chronic memory disorders, often miss this
limitation period for reasons flowing directly from their disability.
CPP Review Committees have awarded benefits in at least two such
cases in Ontario on the grounds that the limitation period in such
cases discriminated on grounds of disability. The government eventu-
ally decided not to appeal these decisions, with the result that the
claimants were awarded pensions. However, it seems that the issue will
have to go further at some point; indeed, some advocates have consid-
ered arguing that the entire limitation period is discriminatory because
it applies only to disability pensions, there being no such restriction
for old age pension under the same Act.
There have been other interesting cases at the Review Committee level.
In one case, a Review Committee held that s.15 was violated by a pro-
vision of the Act which denied benefits to disabled contributors on
behalf of factually but not legally adopted children. The Act provided
benefits for children factually adopted prior to the date of the
contributor's disability (and for legally adopted children adopted at
any time) but expressly excluded those factually adopted after this
date.31 In another decision, a Review Committee held that a section
of the Act (since repealed) governing survivor's benefits violated the
Charter. The section provided a definition of "spouse" for the pur-
poses of survivor's benefits which required, where the parties had not
been married, that the applicant had been "publicly represented" as
the spouse of the contributor. In the particular case the parties had
been "street people" who had been homeless for much of the relevant
period. Because the facts arose before s.15(l) came into effect, the
Committee could not consider an equality rights argument However,
it found that the "public representation" requirement-which, as pre-
viously interpreted by the PAB, effectively required the parties to have
lied about their status by purporting to have been married-violated
s.2(b) of the Charter, guaranteeing freedom of expression.3 2 Both of
these Review Committee decisions have been appealed to the PAB by
the federal government.
31. The claimant was represented by Kinna-Aweya Legal Clinic, Thunder Bay.
32. The claimant was represented by Kensington Bellwoods Legal Clinic,
Toronto.
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4. UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE
Charter litigation has to date had more impact on the substance of
unemployment insurance than most other income maintenance pro-
grams. This is reflected in Bill C-21, the bill to amend the Unemploy-
ment Insurance Act currently before the Senate. While the Bill contains
major cutbacks and punitive measures against unemployed workers
generally, it also contains some modest extensions of benefits due in
part to the outcome of earlier Charter litigation. 33
However, none of the judicial decisions in this area in the past year
have accepted further Charter challenges to various provisions of the
unemployment insurance scheme. In Canada (A.G.) v. Young 34, the
claimants challenged a type of "grandfather" clause which relieved
certain people applying for unemployment insurance benefits from a
disqualification provision, as long as they had applied for benefits
before a certain date. The claimants, believing they were not entitled to
the benefits, had not made such an application; they sought to have
applications antedated to take advantage of the amendment. The
Court held that the distinction between groups based on date of appli-
cation created "two separate groups who are not equal" and was there-
fore not discriminatory. In Clarke v. Canada35, it was held that s.15 was
not violated by the denial of unemployment insurance benefits to self-
employed people generally, even though self-employed fishermen as a
class were entitled to benefits. In Meredith v. Canada36, the Federal
Court of Appeal summarily rejected an argument that s.33(1), which
denied benefits to persons who lost their employment by reason of a
labour dispute, violated an employee's freedom of association or
33. In Tetrault-Gadoury v. Canada (Employment and Immigration Commission) (1988),
[1989] 2 F.C. 245, 53 D.L.R.(4th) 384 (CA.), the Federal Court of Appeal held
that denial of full unemployment insurance benefits to claimants upon reach-
ing age 65 violated s.15. In Schacter v. Canada (1988), 52 D.L.R.(4th) 525
(F.C.T.D.), the Federal Court Trial Division held that biological parents of new
born children were entitled under s.15 to the same child care benefits as adop-
tive parents. Schacter was appealed to the Court of Appeal on the issue of what
kind of remedy could be granted by a court in the face of such a finding, but
the federal government did not challenge the substantive decision on appeal:
(1990), 66 D.LR.(4th) 635 (F.CA-).
34. (1989), 100 N.R. 333 (F.C.A.)
35. (1990), 21 A.C.W.S.(3d) 138 (F.CA.)
36. (1989), 104 N.R. 314 (F.CA.).
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equality rights, stating that these issues had already been determined
by prior caselaw.
5. HEALTH CARE
Finally, there have been some recent decisions in relation to govern-
ment funded health programs of interest for the purposes of this
review. While the specific programs and issues considered in the cases
discussed below are perhaps not of the same kind of general impor-
tance to the low income community as the income maintenance issues
discussed, they have been included here because the approaches taken
by the courts deciding them illustrate in many ways some of the main
problems surrounding the use of the Charter in this area.
In Brown v. British Columbia (Minister of Health)37, a group of AIDS
patients challenged the decision of the provincial government not to
provide full funding for treatment with the experimental drug AZT,
except to persons on social assistance. Full funding was provided for
drugs used in cancer treatment and organ transplants. The evidence
was that most of the plaintiffs, even those not on social assistance,
were unemployed and living on low fixed incomes. The Court rejected
challenges to the government's decision under both s.7 and s.15. With
respect to s.7, Coultas J. held that any deprivation of security of the
person "lies in the fact that they are infected with a debilitating and
incurable disease" and not through any action of government He went
on to hold that their s.7 claim rested on "economic deprivation"; while
accepting that the plaintiffs were suffering economic hardship, he
stated that "a reduction in the standard of living is not a deprivation
contemplated by s.7 of the Charter".3 8 He concluded further that s.7
did not apply to the situation where a plaintiff was seeking a benefit to
"enhance" life, liberty or security of the person.39
With respect to s.15, the plaintiffs argued that they were discriminated
against on grounds of sexual orientation (90% of AIDS patients were
homosexual or bisexual men). Coultas J. conceded that sexual orienta-
tion was a prohibited ground of discrimination under s.15, in accord-
37. (1990), 66 D.L.R.(4th) 444 (B.C.S.C.)
38. Ibid., at 466,467.
39. Ibid., at 469.
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ance with the Andrews test. Nevertheless, he held that there was neither
direct nor indirect discrimination on these grounds. The latter holding
is of most concern for the purposes of this article. Coultas J. accepted
a government argument that, in essence, full funding of some drugs
for catastrophic illness was provided for the convenience of research
administration; because the treatment therapies for cancer patients
and AIDS patients involved different protocols for drug administra-
tion, the difference in funding was not the sort of inequality addressed
by s.15. Finally, Coultas J. also made some obiter comments on the
application of s.15(2) of the Charter. He held that even if the special
drug funding programs for cancer and transplant patients could be
considered discriminatory they would be justifiable under s.15(2). This
leads to what in some ways seems to be the real heart of the decision:
the statement that "a government, unable to confer benefits on any
person unless it confers an equal benefit on all, will be faced with one
viable option: of conferring benefits on no one.".40
In Ontario Nursing Home Association v. Ontario41 , the issue was the pro-
vision of "extended care"-i.e., nursing and personal care for the resi-
dents of certain care facilities-to residents of nursing homes. Due to a
complicated division of legislative jurisdiction between provincial min-
istries, the levels of extended care provided to residents of nursing
homes (operated for profit) were less than those provided to residents
of facilities known as Homes for the Aged (not operated for profit).
The plaintiffs argued that the differential levels of funding violated
ss.7 and 15 of the Charter. LE. Holland J. agreed that it was both
illogical and unfair that homes for the aged should receive more fund-
ing per extended care resident than nursing homes, but rejected both
Charter arguments. With respect to s.7 he held, in language very close
to that used in Brown that while the plaintiff nursing home resident
might receive greater care with additional funding, it could not be said
that he was being deprived of life, liberty and security of the person:
"The section does not deal with property rights and as such does not
deal with additional benefits which might enhance life, liberty or secu-
rity of the person" 42 With respect to s.15, Holland J. doubted that
40. Ibid., at 463.
41. (1990), 74 O.R.(2d) 365 (H.CJ.)
42. Ibid., at 378.
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there had even been a deprivation of an equality right, since it was up
to the nursing home to determine whether to provide more care than
the statutory minimum based on its allocation of all funds received.
He went on to hold that, in any event, any discrimination suffered by
the individual plaintiff was based on the type of residence occupied,
stating: "The place of residence was chosen by [the plaintiffs wife] for
the plaintiff. In the circumstances of this case, the place of residence is
not a personal characteristic."43
OTHER CHARTER DEVELOPMENTS
A review of Charter developments with a direct impact on poverty law
practice must also mention some developments in relation to Charter
procedure and remedial powers that are of special importance for liti-
gation in this area.
1. JURISDICTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNALS
Much poverty law practice is carried on before a wide range of admin-
istrative tribunals; thus, the jurisdiction of these tribunals to consider
and apply the Charter is an important practice issue. As some of the
cases discussed above illustrate, this issue has presented a stumbling
block for some litigation initiatives in the past. However, the issue
seems to be moving closer to resolution. There is a growing judicial
consensus that most administrative tribunals have a limited jurisdic-
tion to apply the Charter.44 It is generally agreed that there are two
heads of remedial jurisdiction in Charter matters. The first derives
expressly from s.24(l) of the Charter, which authorizes a "court of
competent jurisdiction" to grant an "appropriate and just' remedy for
a violation of a Charter right, while the second flows by inference
from s.52(l) of the Constitution Ac4 1982, which states that any law
43. ]bid, at 379.
44. There is a large body and growing body of caselaw dealing with this issue:
e.g., see Douglas/Kwanten Faculty Association v. Douglas College, 119881 2
W.W.R. 718 (B.C.C.A.); Zwarich v. Canada (1987), 82 N.R. 341, 26 Admin.L.R.
295 (F.C.A.); Tetrault-Gadoury v. Canada (Employment and Immigration Com-
mission), supra note 33. My summary here of the state of the caselaw is
somewhat simplified. For example, there are conflicting federal court deci-
sions on this issue and the issue has still not finally been settled in that
jurisdiction: e.g., see Vincer v. A.G.(Can.) (1987), 82 N.R. 352 (F.CA.), per
Marceau J.
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inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution is "of no force or
effect" to the extent of the inconsistency. Most courts have now
accepted that an administrative tribunal, at least one which is required
to determine questions of law in the exercise of its functions, may and
indeed must apply the Charter under s.52(l). If it determines that a
particular law before it is inconsistent with the Charter (or presumably
with any other section of the Constitution Act) it must treat the law as
being of no force or effect to the extent of the inconsistency. This rea-
soning was adopted by the Ontario Court of Appeal in Cuddy Chicks
Ltd. v. Ontario Labour Relations Board45, the most recent major appel-
late decision to consider the issue. Conversely, the weight of judicial
authority is that most such tribunals do not constitute "courts of com-
petent jurisdiction" within the meaning of s.24(l) and thus are not
able to grant specific remedies under that section. Cuddy Chicks, along
with one of the leading cases from the Federal Court of Appeal,4\is
now before the Supreme Court of Canada.
2. REMEDIAL POWERS
Apart from the special problems of the jurisdiction of administrative
tribunals to consider Charter arguments, one of the most important
general issues affecting Charter litigation in relation to social welfare
programs is the extent of the remedial powers conferred by s.24(1).
This issue was considered by the Federal Court of Appeal in its recent
decision in Schacter v. Canada.47 The situation in that case was that in
order to grant an effective remedy in relation to legislation which vio-
lated the Charter by being underinclusive--i.e., which excluded by
omission a class held to be entitled to benefits extended to an
included class-it was necessary for the Court to order the government
directly to pay the benefits. A declaration of unconstitutionality in
these circumstances would simply have deprived the included class of
benefits while failing to extend them to the excluded class. The gov-
ernment argued that in such cases, such a declaration was the only
45. (1989), 62 D.L.R.(4th) 125.
46. Tetrault-Gadoury v. Canada, supra note 33.
47. (1990), 66 D.L.R.(4th) 635.
Poverty Law and The Charter
remedial option. This argument had in fact been accepted in at least
one earlier case dealing with social benefits. 48
The majority of the Court in Schacter affirmed that s.24(l) was broad
enough to empower a court in such circumstances to order the govern-
ment to provide the benefits to the excluded class. Stating that s.24(l)
must be interpreted with "flexibility" and "imagination" so as to pro-
vide meaningful remedies for Charter violations, Heald J.A. held that
"underinclusive legislation invites a remedy extending benefits". 49 The
majority expressly rejected the federal government's argument that it
was beyond the judicial power under the Charter to make an order
that would effect "the appropriation of public funds" and thus
impinge on Parliament's authority to tax and raise revenues, observing
that many kinds of Charter challenges necessarily resulted in the
expenditure of public funds regardless of the form of the order, a
result inherent in the nature of the process itself.
CHARTER LITIGATION AND POVERTY LAW:
CURRENT ISSUES
There is a certain irony in the results of the Charter decisions
reviewed above. On one hand, some of the procedural and remedial
issues that have posed barriers to or at least caused uncertainties for
Charter litigation in poverty law areas are being resolved in ways that
might be seen as encouraging such litigation. On the other hand, the
actual success rate of Charter challenges in this area, never very high,
has been even lower over the past year-not one of the cases reviewed
here which went to the point of judicial decision in the past year was
successful. At least at this point in the history of the development of
Charter jurisprudence, then, it seems that the main barriers to litiga-
tion in this area lie in the definition of substantive rights themselves.
Of course this does not mean that there are no other constraints limit-
ing the impact of the Charter in this regard. All of the usual systemic
factors constraining test case litigation strategies in this area still exist,
48. See A.G.(M...) v. Phillips (1986), 34 D.L.R.(4th) 633 (N.S.CA.) in which the Court
responded to a finding that social assistance legislation violated s.15 by being
underinclusive, by declaring the legislative provisions that provided authority to
grant benefits to be unconstitutional.
49. Supra, note 47 at 650.
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including limited financial and legal resources, problems of finding
appropriate cases and clients who are willing or able to sustain
lengthy litigation proceedings, etc.50 Furthermore, the importance of
the developments in the law of procedure and remedies discussed
above should not be overstated. For example, although the broad affir-
mation of the Charter's remedial powers in Schacter is obviously
important, the very nature of s.15, which protects relational rather than
absolute rights to social benefits, is such that the final decisions about
resource allocations consequent on judicial rulings remain with the
legislative branch.51 It is also not altogether clear to what extent devel-
opments regarding the jurisdiction of administrative tribunals to con-
sider the Charter will make litigation in this area easier. To the extent
that such tribunals can consider Charter arguments, poverty law advo-
cates who regularly practice before such tribunals will probably be
encouraged to make arguments in this forum. At least some judges
have assumed that this will increase the ease and convenience of con-
stitutional litigation.52 However, the jurisdictional dichotomy created
50. Some of these problems are in fact related to doctrinal issues not considered in
this article. For example, the problem of finding a suitable plaintiff, prepared to
undertake lengthy and stressful litigation for what may be a small amount of
money, is affected by laws governing standing. Even though the law regarding
public interest standing has been considerably liberalized in recent years, it is
still often very difficult for groups such as non-profit corporations to get stand-
ing to sustain Charter litigation even though they may be the only ones realisti-
cally able to put forward positions on behalf of the people most affected by the
issues. In some cases courts have held that incorporated bodies cannot assert
"individual" rights: e.g., see the Ontario Nursing Home Association case, supra,
note 41. In other cases courts have held that the issues could be raised by some-
one else, even though the body seeking standing may have been able to present
the issue from a different perspective. Finally, a challenge to the standing of the
claimants may cause substantial delays and increased expense regardless of the
eventual ruling, as in the Federated Anti-Poverty Groups of B.C. case, supra, notes
12, 13.
51. Thus, it is always the prerogative of government whether to expand resource
commitments to a particular program to effectuate a judicial decision, or
simply to redistribute the same allocation so that some recipients benefit at
the expense of cutbacks for others: the example usually given of this is
Silano v. British Columbia (1987), 42 D.L.R.(4th) 307 (B.C.S.C.), where the
provincial government responded to a finding that a social assistance eligi-
bility rule violated s.15 by equalizing the benefits while keeping the amount
of funds allocated to the program the same.
52. See Cuddy Chicks, supra, note 45, per Grange J.A.
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by the caselaw may make this apparent convenience illusory. Even
assuming that the distinction can clearly be made, it is often not easy
to determine in advance what kind of remedy will be required or
appropriate in a given case, especially where multiple theories about
the nature of the constitutional violation are being advanced.
However, although significant barriers to Charter litigation in other
areas still exist, they are not insurmountable and are diminishing as
they become clarified by caselaw. The issue of ultimate importance
here remains whether such litigation can succeed. In the following sec-
tions I propose to examine in more detail the substantive issues pre-
sented in the cases discussed above and to consider what this means
about the judicial conception of what interests Should be protected
under the rubric of fundamental rights. In the end, no real assessment
of the possibilities for Charter litigation in this area can be made with-
out taking these attitudes and their ideological underpinnings into
account.
To the extent that a single common theme emerges in this area, it is a
deep reluctance to allow interests in relation to social benefit schemes
to be characterized as "rights" at all.
This theme does not have only one doctrinal manifestation-and
indeed I should make it clear here that in my view doctrine only occa-
sionally provides a strong determinant of outcome in this kind of liti-
gation 53-but rather operates through a variety of doctrinal devices.
What I want to focus on here is not whether the purported application
53. My point here is not that doctrine never constrains results in constitutional liti-
gation. It is clear that judges feel constrained at least to some extent by the
internal logic of doctrinal argument. An interesting example of such constraint
operating in an area closely related to those under consideration here is the
decision of the Manitoba Court of Appeal in Alcoholism Foundation of Manitoba
v. City of Winnipeg (1990), 69 D.L.R.(4th) 697 (Man.C.A.), reversing 119861 6
W.W.R. 440, 59 Man.R.(2d) 83. striking down a municipal zoning by-law which
placed geographic restrictions on the location of group care and rehabilitation
housing for the aged, the disabled, convalescents, ex-prisoners and persons
recovering from drug or alcohol addiction. At least one of the judges in the
case, Monnin CJ.M, while openly sympathetic to the defendants and patently
reluctant to allow the s.15 claim, indicated that he felt the Andrews decision to
be determinative of the result. However, this does not change the fact that there
are few Charter cases, especially equality cases, where plausible doctrinal argu-
ment cannot be made on both sides of the issue.I
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of constitutional doctrine is right or wrong in any particular case, but
the significance of this reluctance. I suggest that perhaps the most
important point revealed by these cases is the force of the ideological
position that social benefits-especially those provided as social assis-
tance but to some extent also those provided as social insurance-rep-
resent a privilege or government largesse; and that claims of
entitlement to such benefits fit uneasily at best into a rights regime
largely predicated on the concept of protecting the autonomy of indi-
viduals from state intervention.54 The following analysis will consider
the only two Charter sections of any real importance in litigation in
this area, ss.7 and 15.
1. SECTION 7
Since the Charter came into effect in 1982, s.7 has been invoked in
numerous challenges to regulatory schemes outside the criminal law
field. It has had a major impact on some areas of law of importance
to elements of the low income community-most notably, of course,
immigration law55. However, it has become increasingly unlikely that
s.7 will play any role at all in judicial regulation of social benefit pro-
grams of the kind under consideration here. Developments of the past
year have simply confirmed themes already established in the caselaw.
The threshold issue for the application of s.7 is whether the particular
interests being asserted fall within the scope of the phrase "life, liberty
and security of the person" or, more precisely, whether the impugned
state action in a particular case involves a deprivation of one of these
rights. The caselaw has been virtually unanimous in holding that the
54. Unfortunately I will be able to do little more than sketch out this proposition
here. I have dealt with this aspect of social welfare ideology and its manifesta-
tion in social welfare jurisprudence in more detail elsewhere: Ian Morrison,
"The Impact of the Charter of Rights on Social Welfare Programs" (Prepared
for the Southwest Region Clinics' Association Conference: October 1989)
[unpublished].
55. Specifically, of course, the procedures for the determination of Convention
refugee status under immigration laws. The seminal case in this area is the
decision of the Supreme Court in Singh v. Canada, 119851 1 S.C.R. 177, 17
D.L.R.(4th) 422, holding that refugee determination procedures fell within
s.7 and therefore had to be in accordance with principles of fundamental
justice. Section 7 has subsequently been invoked in a number of cases
involving immigration procedures affecting refugee claimants.
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provision or denial of social benefits does not implicate s.7 in this
way. Cases decided prior to the period under review here had already
held that s.7 does not protect interests in such things as workers' com-
pensation benefits56, unemployment insurance benefits57 or tenancy
rights in subsidized housing5 8. To this list can now be added the kinds
of health care benefits at issue in Brown v. British Columbia and the
Ontario Nursing Home Association case.
The decisions in all these cases have been based on a distinction
drawn by the courts between "personal" rights of liberty and security
of the person and "economic" or "property" rights. Despite claimants'
arguments that in many contexts physical well-being is so integrally
related to access to certain kinds of benefits that security of the person
is directly affected by denial of such benefits, Canadian courts have
uniformly relegated all forms of individual/state transactions mediated
through economic forms into the excluded category of economic
rights. The important thing here is not that s.7 has been interpreted as
not protecting economic rights. The economic rights exclusion oper-
ates of course as a general principle and not always disadvantageously
to the low income community. (For example, in a recent Ontario deci-
sion, this distinction was used to reject an attack by two landlords on
residential rent regulation legislation.59 The Court held that s.7 did not
protect landlords' purely economic interest in their investments and
that, at worst, the plaintiffs in that case had suffered some reductions
in their profits on an investment which had shown a large capital
appreciation since it had been purchased.) Rather, what matters is that
every interest asserted to date in relation to social benefit schemes has
been placed on the economic side of the contingent and unstable line
between "personal" and "property" rights.6° Admittedly, as noted
above, the issue of whether s.7 might afford some protection to subsis-
56. See cases cited supra, note 17.
57. See Zwarich v. Canada, supra, note 44.
58. See Re Bernard and Dartmouth Housing Authority (1988), 53 D.L.R.(4th) 81
(N.S.CA.).
59. Haddock v. Ontario (1990), 73 O.R.(2d) 545 (H.CJ.).
60. That the line is contingent is illustrated by the fact that even the Supreme
Court has recognized the problem of untangling economic and personal
interests: see infra, note 61. That it is unstable is illustrated clearly in the
decision of the British Columbia Court of Appeal in Wilson v. British Colum-
bia Medical Commission (1988), 30 B.C.L.R.(2d) I (B.C.C.A.).
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tence level benefits remains open, and the Supreme Court has been
careful not to preclude the possibility that liberty and security of the
person may protect some rights with an "economic component". 61
However, even if welfare rights are protected on this basis, it seems
clear that the general theme of this caselaw will not be reversed. The
direction these doctrinal developments have taken and the way the lib-
erty/property dichotomy is formulated in relation to particular interests
has some important implications for the conceptualization of the
nature of individual "rights" under the Charter.
Most cases in which these issues have arisen have simply labelled the
interests at stake as "economic interests" because they involve cash
transfers and are therefore excluded from s.7 ipsofacto. Thus, all inter-
ests mediated through cash forms are assimilated to a common and
broadly abstracted category. For example, the situation of the AIDS
patients in Brown, required to pay up to $2000 per year from limited
incomes for AZT treatment can be equated rhetorically to the situation
of two Ontario landlords who argued that their s.7 rights were violated
by residential rent regulation laws which reduced the rate of profit
returned by their property investment. The consequence of this assimi-
lation is that both cases become, in the language of Brown, questions
of "lifestyle". The exclusionary use of the liberty/property distinction,
which previously had far less significance for any formal doctrinal
purposes in Canadian law has now become a hierarchical dichotomy
which not only excludes, but in the context of discourse involving
"rights" claims, devalues the interests falling into the excluded cate-
gory. In the language of the cases, the excluded interests easily become
not just "economic rights" but "mere economic rights".
61. See Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec (A.G.), [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927, 58 D.L.R.(4th) 577; Refer-
ence Re Criminal Code, Sections 193 and 195.1(1Xc), [1990] 4 W.W.R. 481, per
Dickson CJ.C. at 495.
It must also be said however that there is little in that Court's jurisprudence to
suggest that it would accept such an argument. On the basis of expressed opin-
ions, most students of the Court would probably agree that the judge most
likely to receive such an argument favourably is Justice Wilson. The same can-
not be said for any other judge on the Court (and such speculation is compli-
cated by the fact that there are so many new faces on the Court). Against
Wilson J.'s views must also be balanced the apparently much narrower view of
Lamer CJ. as stated in his obiter comments in Reference re Criminal Code Sec-
tions 193 and 195.1(1Xc), supra.
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Some cases, including Brown and the Ontario Nursing Home Association
case, go beyond simply asserting the liberty/property dichotomy to
raise the further issue of the meaning of "deprivation" by the state in
this context. A distinction is drawn here between actions by the state
which "deprive" individuals of security of the person, and the denial
of benefits, characterized as a mere "failure to enhance security of the
person", a matter not within the purview of s.7. This is an important
rhetorical move. The liberty/property dichotomy continues to operate
for the most part within a framework of interests defined in legal
terms and characterized or able to be characterized as legal entitle-
ments. The causation analysis, however, distances both the state and
the legal system even further from the issue at stake: here, events sim-
ply flow from "natural" causes following their course, like the disease
killing the AIDS patients in Brown.
This approach reflects an interesting twist on one of the main ideolog-
ical structures of the Charter. Andrew Petter and Alan Hutchison have
argued that "the major function of a liberal Charter is to police the
boundary that separates the political and the collective from the pre-
political and the individual-to contain the state so as to prevent it
from intruding, in its utilitarian zeal, upon the 'natural' realm of indi-
vidual liberty".62 In these cases, it seems, the Charter does not just
police this boundary so as keep the state out, but equally so as to pre-
vent the matters allocated to the private sector from placing any
claims on the state.
None of this means that s.7 could never have an impact in this area.
The liberty/property distinction can be inverted by arguments that
"personal" aspects of liberty and security of the person are infringed
by coercive use of state economic power operating through social ben-
efits.63 However, such arguments present an opportunity, not an obli-
62. Andrew Petter & Alan Hutchison, "Private Rights/Public Wrongs: The Liberal
Lie of the Charter" (1987), 38 U.T.L J. 278 at 284.
63. For a successful use of this approach, see Wilson v. British Columbia Medical
Commission, supra, note 60. An example in a current case attempting such an
approach in the social welfare context is the argument that compelling sin-
gle mothers to pursue child support, from men they may wish for good rea-
son to have no contact with, as a condition of receiving social assistance,
infringes their liberty and security of the person: see the Federated Anti-Pov-
erty Groups of British Columbia case, supra, note 12.
(1990) 6 Journal of Law and Social Policy
gation, for courts to escape this dichotomy and there is little in the
caselaw to date to suggest that judges are eager to take up this oppor-
tunity.64
2. SECTION 15
Section 15 has had more impact on social benefit programs than s.7.
However, the jurisprudence reviewed in this article indicates that suc-
cess in equality litigation in this area is at least temporarily stalled.
This is an interesting development, since the cases reviewed here are
also the first group to show the impact in this area of the equality test
enunciated by the Supreme Court of Canada decision in Law Society
of British Columbia v. Andrews.65 These cases show that there are still
major doctrinal and ideological barriers to equality arguments in rela-
tion to exclusions from social welfare benefit schemes.
In almost all the cases reviewed above the claimants were seeking to
challenge under s.15 their exclusion from some kind of direct govern-
ment benefit. What is immediately noticeable about these cases is not
simply that the claimants failed in all of them, but that in not one of
the cases was the court prepared to accept that even a primafacie case
of discrimination had been made out sufficient to call upon the gov-
ernment for justification under s.1. As with s.7, the courts have gone as
far as possible in these cases to avoid recognition of the claims
asserted as presenting constitutionally cognizable interests, which
would of course move the inquiry to the more openly political issue of
balancing state interests against individual rights. There are a number
of points arising from these cases worth considering here.
64. See, for example, Camire v, City of Winnipeg (1989), 57 Man.R.(2d) 192 (CA.),
where it was argued that an order making receipt of welfare benefits by an alco-
holic conditional on his residing in a treatment centre violated ss.7 and 15. The
Court of Appeal refused to grant leave to appeal, stating that the case did. not
present an issue of substance. The point is made even more clearly in Re
A.G.(Nfld.) and Nfld. & Labrador Housing Corp. (1988), 38 D.L.R.(4th) 355 (Nld.
CA.), where the Court stated in reponse to a challenge against subsidized hous-
ing tenancy regulation: "[N]o one is obliged to become a subsidized tenant.
While a certain amount of compulsion may arise out of economic circum-
stance, subsidized housing is not the only form of social assistance available".
65. Supra, note 19.
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a. The "'personal characteristics" requirement
The equality test posed by the Supreme Court in Andrews requires, in
order for there to be a finding of discrimination, that any inequality in
treatment created by a law must be based in some way on the kinds of
personal characteristics enumerated in s.15(1) or characteristics analo-
gous thereto. While this has probably made some kinds of equality
arguments on behalf of disadvantaged groups easier, Andrews may also
have narrowed the scope of s.15 in this area. It seems likely that eco-
nomic disadvantages can be more easily perceived by courts as indicia
of other kinds of disadvantage than as a disadvantage itself. For exam-
ple, the Alberta Court of Appeal held in a recent case that s.15 was not
violated by rules which made provision of funded counsel for indigent
accused discretionary in criminal appeals, stating: "If indigency can
fell legislation under the Charter, the Charter should say so".66 Ironi-
cally, the Court suggested that the claimants argument may have had
more force before Andrews.
However, as the discussion in the following section will show, the
main problem in the cases reviewed here has not been the identifica-
tion of the claimant with a disadvantaged group, but the translation of
that characterization into prohibited discrimination.
b. Adverse impact discrimination
One of the most important issues arising from the jurisprudence
reviewed here is its implications for "adverse impact" equality argu-
ments. In many of the cases discussed above, it was accepted by the
courts that the claimant belonged to a disadvantaged group in the
sense required by the Andrews test. However, in only one of these cases
did the impugned legislation expressly draw a distinction on the basis
of the characteristics in question. Thus, the main doctrinal issue in the
caselaw, whether explicitly stated in the judgment or not, was the con-
cept of adverse impact discrimination.
This is a very important concept for equality litigation in this area:
there can be little doubt that adverse impact arguments have poten-
tially far more sweeping consequences for equality litigation argu-
ments in relation to social benefit schemes than express
discrimination arguments. Unfortunately, the cases under review here
show little inclination on the part of the courts to engage in such an
66. R. v. Robinson (1989), 63 D.L.R.(4th) 289 at 321 (Alta. CA.).
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analysis. These cases illustrate the use of two closely related tech-
niques to avoid giving effect to an adverse impact analysis.
Voluntarism: The first technique is the attribution of the cause of dis-
crimination to something other than the structure of the legal regime
itself, usually to the "voluntary" conduct of the individual claimant
Examples of this can be seen in Re Heidekamp and Director of Support
and Custody Enforcement where it was held that any inequality between
the claimant and wage earners subject to garnishment was "caused" by
his own actions in defaulting on support payments and in Auger v.
Alberta (W.CB.), where it was suggested that the compensation scheme
did not discriminate against the claimant because he had the "choice"
of working for another employer. In the Ontario Nursing Home Associa-
tion case the Court actually invoked two levels of intervening cause to
separate the government from the impugned disadvantage, holding
first that the level of nursing care received by nursing home residents
was up to the home and, second, that in any event the plaintiffs wife
had "chosen" this kind of care by choosing the residence for him. A
closely related theme appears in Brown v. British Columbia, where the
judge stated: "To the extent that the drug is efficacious, it can be said
that those being given it receive a benefit. No one is compelled to take
the drug".67
From a doctrinal point of view these comments seem little short of
bizarre; certainly there is no effort made in any of the cases to suggest
why any of these "voluntary" acts should be relevant to an equality
analysis.6 8 However, what is important here is the fact that the com-
ments would be made at all. What these comments indicate, I would
suggest, is not necessarily an ideological antipathy to the idea of
equality rights per se, but rather another manifestation of a reluctance
to accept that interests in social benefits provided by the state should
be the matter of constitutionally protected "rights", even under s.15.
Judicial attitudes towards anti-discrimination claims no doubt vary
considerably, but it is significant that these comments were all made
67. Supra, note 37 at 464.
68. The implied reasoning here may be tested against the argument that exclu-
sionary distinctions made on the basis of pregnancy are not discriminatory
because pregnancy is (usually) a voluntary state: cf. Brooks v. Canada Safe-
way Ltd. (1989), 59 D.L.R.(4th) 321 (S.C.C.).
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in the context of claims where the legislation in question did not
explicitly draw distinctions on s.15 grounds.
Structural rationality: The second technique I will examine here has
even more potential for undermining the concept of adverse impact
discrimination. What may be seen in most of the cases, implicitly or
explicitly, is an assertion that the impugned distinction was justified
because it was required to maintain the structural integrity or internal
logic of the benefit scheme under attack. Of course one would expect
such arguments to be made in relation to s.l, as reason not to give
effect to a prima facie finding of discrimination (and this issue was in
fact treated this way in Auger v. Alberta). However, the point I wish to
make here is that these kinds of factors seem to have been adopted in
most of the cases considered above as reasons for holding that the leg-
islative scheme was not discriminatory, thus avoiding reference to s.1
altogether.
Again, Brown v. British Columbia provides a good illustration, since the
Court expressly dealt with an adverse impact argument in that case.
While the Court acknowledged that adverse impact discrimination was
covered by s.15, the actual reasons given in the case would seem to
negate the concept entirely. The Court held, as noted above, that there
was no discrimination because the treatment protocol for AZT was
different from the treatment protocols for the drugs used to treat can-
cer and transplant patients: the government was entitled to fully fund
the latter but not the former as an incentive to doctors to follow these
protocols.
If the parameters of the benefit scheme and its internal logic form the
entire landscape within which discrimination can be sought, it will not
often be found. Few eligibility rules in social benefit schemes cannot
be explained as having some kind of current "purpose" in relation to
the internal logic of the benefit scheme. If this is so, however, the idea
that effect as well as intent implicates the prohibition against discrimi-
nation is rendered almost meaningless. Such cases will never even get
to the point of permitting an inquiry, under s.1, whether remedying the
disadvantage of the claimant should take precedence over the fiscal
interests or administrative convenience of the state. Again, I suggest
that this technique is in no sense doctrinally mandated, but provides a
convenient method of limiting the extension of rights claims into areas
uncomfortable for courts to deal with.
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C. Direct Discrimination
The limited amount of caselaw in this area to date suggests that the
best chances of success in an equality challenge to social benefit legis-
lation is where the legislation expressly distinguishes classes on the
basis of an enumerated or analogous characteristic. However, the only
such case in the jurisprudence reviewed here, McInnis v. Director of
Social Planning Department, shows how even in these cases judges can
find techniques for avoiding a prima facie finding of discrimination. In
Mcnnis, the trial court avoided finding an express age-based distinc-
tion to be discriminatory simply by asserting that the distinction was
"based on" the legal attributes of the age in question.
The decision in Mclnnis illustrates another important problem of
equality litigation. As many equality theorists, particularly feminist
theorists, have pointed out, it is precisely the most deeply embedded
modes of disadvantage which are the most difficult to make visible as
disadvantage, being so firmly established in legal and social practice
that they appear part of the natural order.69 Thus, as Mclnnis shows,
the very disadvantage at issue can be formulated as its own justifica-
tion. Furthermore, the issue may not even appear as a formal issue of
justification, but may be invoked to preclude even a finding of dis-
crimination.
d. Section 15(2)
The final doctrinal issue I want to consider here is the application of
s.15(2), the so-called "affirmative action" section, to social benefit pro-
grams. Section 15(2) provides that s.15(1) "does not preclude" any law,
program or activity aimed at the amelioration of disadvantage. The
purpose of the section seems clear: to protect governmental attempts to
advance the situations of disadvantaged groups and individuals from
attacks by relatively advantaged individuals. Until recently, s.15(2)
arguments had not been given much attention in equality litigation in
this area and were not successful in the few cases in which they were
69. A fuller exposition of this issue is beyond the scope of this article. For a recent
discussion of this problem in the context of gender discrimination issues in
Charter litigation, see Gwen Brodsky & Shelagh Day, Canadian Charter Equality
Rights for Women: One Step Fonvard Or Two Steps Back (Canadian Action Com-
mittee on the Status of Women, 1989).
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raised.7° Recent developments, however, show that s.15(2) is suscepti-
ble to some very different interpretations and that its application in
this area is far from settled.
It will be recalled that in Brown v. British Columbia, the Court held that
if discrimination existed, it would be obviated by s.15(2). Specifically,
the Court-held that,"Even if the special drug funding programmes for
cancer and transplant patients could be considered discriminatory,
they would, in my view, be justified pursuant to s.15(2)'. 71 There is an
interesting slippage in the language of the case at this point which has
very serious consequences for the application of s.15(2). Section 15(2),
as noted, simply provides that ameliorative action is not precluded by
s.15(1). The plaintiffs in Brown were, of course, not attacking the valid-
ity of the funding programs for cancer patients but were claiming that
the government was discriminating against them by its refusal to pro-
vide full funding for AZT. Even accepting the Court's proposition that
cancer and transplant patients are "disadvantaged" groups within the
intended meaning of s.15(2), if this line of reasoning is correct it seems
that if a program is ameliorative for anyone, it is immune from attack
on equality grounds, even where alleged to be discriminatory in rela-
tion to some other disadvantaged individual or group.
Another very problematical recent use of s.15(2) in a slightly different
context is the decision of the Ontario District Court in Fleming v.
Reid.73 The case involved a challenge to a provision of the Ontario
Mental Health Act, arguing that it violated the equality rights of incom-
petent involuntary patients in psychiatric facilities by allowing them to
be treated with narcoleptic drugs against their expressed wishes. In
rejecting this argument, the Court stated, inter alia, "surely the provis-
ions of s.15(2) are directed to legislation like [the Act) which is of a
social interest character aimed at ameliorating a disadvantaged group
in our society." If anything, the implications of this reasoning go even
further than Brown, suggesting that s.15(2) may even immunize legisla-
70. See Reference Re Family Benefits Act (1986), 75 N.S.R.(2d) 338 (C.A.); Silano v
British Columbia, supra, note 51.
71. Supra, note 37 at 463.
73. (1990), 73 O.R.(2d) 169 (Dist.Ct.).
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don from equality attacks by the very individuals whose disadvantage
is supposedly ameliorated by it.74
CONCLUSIONS
The review of cases and litigation activity in the first part of this arti-
cle suggests that (bearing in mind that the volume of test case litiga-
tion in poverty law areas tends to be limited at best) there are a
substantial number of Charter challenges being brought to various
aspects of social welfare programs. If anything, this volume is increas-
ing.75 This growth reflects the fact that the Charter is having a growing
impact on Canadian legal discourse, or at least those parts of it con-
cerned with matters of public law and the relation between govern-
ment and individuals. The Charter is undoubtedly affecting the
expectations of advocates and activists-and probably many clients as
well-about what issues can be framed as "legal" issues subject to
judicial review. The Charter has certainly expanded the "legal" realm
to include a large part of what were previously exclusively political
questions. I have little doubt that many poverty law practitioners will
continue to invoke the Charter in challenges to social welfare pro-
grams, both to try to obtain benefits for individual clients and to try to
compel law reform.
In contrast, Charter decisions in relation to these matters have not
shown a comparable expansiveness on the part of the judiciary
towards rights claims involving social benefit programs. While Charter
arguments have found favour with a few administrative tribunals
charged with overseeing these programs, they have met a uniformly
cool reception at the judicial level. As the analysis of recent decisions
in the last section shows, it has been very difficult to persuade courts
to acknowledge claims in relation to social benefits as presenting con-
stitutionally cognizable interests.
74. For a more general review of issues involving s.15(2) and comparable sections
under provincial human rights legislation, see Shelagh Day, "Equality Seekers
Troubled By Affirmative Action Rulings", VI (January, 1990) Can. Human
Rights Advocate 1.
75. I would note here, from personal experience, that the number of advocates
using the research services of the Ontario Legal Aid Plan for assistance in
formulating Charter arguments in relation to social benefit legislation has
slowly but steadily increased in the four years that research services have
been offered in this area.
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I would not want to overstate the implications of these developments.
The fact that litigation successes in this area seem to be halted does
not mean that the Charter will have no further impact in this area.
Indeed, as the American experience shows, the nature of constitutional
adjudication is such that the substantive content of constitutional
rights can never be considered finally determined as long as there is
constitutional litigation. However, it seems clear that, in the short term
at least, the decks are loaded against success in Charter litigation in
relation to social welfare programs, except perhaps in the clearest
cases of discrimination based on grounds that courts can easily recog-
nize. The obvious judicial reluctance to interfere in the name of fun-
damental rights with what the state gives, as opposed to what it takes
away, suggests that the reality of any such litigation will usually
involve a struggle just to have the issues brought within the ambit of
"fundamental rights". And, as the analysis in this article suggests, doc-
trinal arguments abstracted from cases dealing with other issues in
other contexts may not have much force in the face of this reluctance.
